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Gideon and the Effective Assistance of
Counsel: The Rhetoric and the Reality
David Rudovskyt
Introduction
It is now fifty years since the Supreme Court responded to
"Gideon's Trumpet"' by establishing a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for all persons accused of felony offenses, forty years after
that right was extended to most misdemeanor defendants, 2 and
close to thirty years after the Court ruled that the right to counsel
includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.' Over this
period of time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
"[blecause the right to counsel is so fundamental to a fair trial, the
Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though
present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair
decision on the merits."4
Indeed, as opposed to the judicial
retrenchment from other landmark constitutional criminal
procedure decisions, including significant Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rulings of the Warren Court, Gideon and its progeny

t. Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Founding Partner,
Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP. I thank Norman Lefstein, Jules
Epstein, Leonard Sosnov, Stephanos Bibas, and Vernon Francis for their insightful
questions and suggestions, and Ronald Nelson for his excellent research assistance.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S
TRUMPET (1964).
2. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-40 (1972).
3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
4. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985). The Court has also correctly
recognized that the right to counsel ensures that "all other rights of the accused are
protected." Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988).
5. Recent Fifth Amendment decisions have limited the protections originally
granted by Miranda. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)
(ensuring the adversarial system's protection against self-incrimination), with
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380-87 (2010) (holding that the Miranda
right to counsel must be invoked "unambiguously" in order to make police stop an
interrogation), and Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (narrowing
Miranda protections with respect to the right to silence by requiring an
"unambiguous" request for an attorney). Recent Fourth Amendment rulings have
also been less protective of privacy than past rulings. Compare Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S 347, 358-59 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment not only
governs the search and seizure of tangible items but also protects recordings of oral
statements), with California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect garbage left outside a residence for collection
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have had solid supporters on the Court, in the academy, and
among the public. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
the broad right to counsel in pre-trial, trial, and appellate
contexts.6
Yet, there is near unanimous agreement that the "promise" of
Gideon has been systematically denied to large numbers of
criminal defendants.
As the National Right to Counsel
Committee of the bi-partisan Constitutional Project stated in 2009:
Yet, today, in criminal and juvenile proceedings in state
courts, sometimes counsel is not provided at all, and it often is
supplied in ways that make a mockery of the great promise of
the Gideon decision and the Supreme Court's soaring rhetoric.
Throughout the United States, indigent defense systems are
struggling. Due to funding shortfalls, excessive caseloads, and
a host of other problems, many are truly failing.... As a
consequence, defense lawyers are constantly forced to violate
their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads make it
impossible for them to practice law as they are required to do
according to the profession's rules. They cannot interview
their clients properly, effectively seek their pretrial release,
file appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact investigations,
negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor, adequately prepare
for hearings, and perform countless other tasks that normally
from warrantless search and seizure), and United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
750-53 (1971) (further limiting the expectation of privacy protections).
6. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (citing
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 n. 3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 398-99 (1977)) ("This Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at
which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are
imposed on his liberty."); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (holding
that a suspended sentence could result in deprivation of a person's liberty and
cannot be imposed unless a defendant is afforded counsel).
7. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR

EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrativellegal.aid-indigent defendants/s sclaid def bp-right to counsel in
criminal proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE]
(systematically exploring the problem of inadequate defense of indigent clients);
KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON (2013) (case studies in which defendants could
not afford an attorney); NAVL AsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAwYERS, MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS
(2009) [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES]; NATL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF

OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT
TO
COUNSEL
(2009),
available
at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]; see
also The Gideon Symposia, 122 YALE L.J. 2106 (2013); Ty Alper, Toward a Right to
Litigate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2013)
(exploring how indigent defendants can vindicate their rights to effective counsel);
Donald A. Dripps, Up From Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113 (2012) (explaining
the paradox of the Gideon decision and challenging the generally prevailing
celebration of it).
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would be undertaken
by a lawyer with sufficient time and
resources. 8
The report of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers
(NACDL)
explained
the caseload
problem
in
misdemeanor courts this way:
Almost [forty] years later, the misdemeanor criminal justice
system is rife with the same problems that existed prior to the
Argersinger decision.
Legal representation for indigent
defendants is absent in many cases. Even when an attorney is
provided to defend a misdemeanor case, crushing workloads
make it impossible for many defenders to effectively represent
clients. Too often, counsel is unable to spend sufficient time
on each of their cases. This forces even the most competent
and dedicated attorneys to run afoul of their professional
duties.9
These developments are a consequence of two related
institutional failures: the abdication of funding responsibilities by
political entities and the lack of judicial implementation of the
Gideon mandate.'o In retrospect, the failure to adequately fund
indigent defense services is not surprising, as Gideon imposed an
unfunded mandate on state and local governments, and criminal
defendants are among the most disliked and politically powerless
constituencies in our polity.n Indeed, as the criminal justice
8. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at 2-7. There is also significant debate as to
the right to counsel in civil cases. The Supreme Court has largely refused to
recognize a right to appointed counsel even where the consequences of the civil
action may be severe. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not automatically require the State
to provide counsel in civil contempt proceedings, even where the indigent
respondent faces incarceration); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32
(1981) (holding that the Constitution does not guarantee right to counsel in civil
proceedings, and that trial courts decide whether due process calls for appointment
of counsel). The ABA has endorsed a right to counsel in civil cases implicating
basic human needs. ABA Resolution 112A (2006); see also John Pollock, 'You Have

a Right to a Lawyer ... If You Can Afford It": A Look at the History of the Right to
Counsel in Civil Cases and the Current Efforts to Expand It, 81 U.S.L.W. 1797
(2013) (examining the growing movement supporting the right to counsel in some
civil cases).
9. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 7, at 14.
10. On the issue of governmental responsibility, see Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at
Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694 (2013), which makes the
argument for a combination of legislative, administrative, and substantive changes
to criminal law to support Gideon's promise of representation for indigent criminal
defendants.
11. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676 (2013)
(arguing that Gideon's promise was not fulfilled due to an unfunded mandate and
Strickland's weak standards); Martin Guggenheim, The People's Right to a WellFunded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 395, 395
(2012) (insisting that structural protections guaranteed by the right to counsel go
"well beyond an individual's due process rights"). The federal government provides
financial assistance to state criminal justice systems, but indigent defense services
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system expanded in terms of prosecutions and rates of
incarceration, defender offices were easy targets for budget-cutting
legislators.12
While the direct cause of the crisis is lack of funding, the
courts share a large part of the blame. Having imposed a nearly
universal duty to appoint counsel in all but the most minor of
criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court has failed to ensure that
this assistance of counsel would be effective: in Strickland v.
Washington,1 3 the Court crafted highly deferential standards for
assessing the effectiveness of defense counsel, and limited the
judicial remedies for defendants seeking relief for the failings of
ineffective lawyers." Moreover, the Strickland standard failed to
account for systemic or structural deficiencies in indigent defense
systems." It is sadly ironic that many elected officials and courts,
who regularly point to Gideon as evidence of our commitment to
fair trials and equal treatment in the criminal justice system, have
failed to take the steps necessary to implement the Gideon
promise.
A broad range of reforms have been proposed to deal with the
widening gap between the rhetoric and reality of the right to
counsel.16 These include a vision of the right to counsel as "a
collective right of the People," implementing free market
receive almost none of this funding. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO12-569, INDIGENT DEFENSE: DOJ COULD INCREASE AWARENESS OF ELIGIBLE
FUNDING AND BETTER DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH FUNDS HELP SUPPORT
THIS PURPOSE 17 (2012).
12. THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO
REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4 (2012) (explaining that in 2007, budgets for state
prosecutors totaled $5.8 billion while defender offices received $2.3 billion). In a
recent manifestation of this trend, the 2013 federal sequester resulted in large cuts
to federal defender budgets, even as similar cuts to federal prosecutor budgets were
avoided by congressional and DOJ action. Ron Nixon, Public Defenders Are

Tightening Belts Because of Steep FederalBudget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013,
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/us/public-defenders-aretightening-belts-because-of-steep-federal-budget-cuts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Attorney General Eric Holder has made special note of this issue. Eric H. Holder,

Jr., Defendants' Legal Rights Undermined by Budget Cuts, WASH. POST (Aug. 22,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-082013),
22/opinions/41435818_1_defender-attorney-general-justice-department.
13. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
14. See infra Section II.
15. See supra note 11.
16. Of course, the problem of the right/remedy gap is not limited to Sixth
Amendment issues. Compare David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of
Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199 (2005), with

Harvey J. Wilkinson, III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practiceof
Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2010).
17. Guggenheim, supra note 11, at 395.
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principles as a means of providing independence to defender
service programs," application of equal protection principles,"
congressionally imposed standards for indigent defense services,20
and a strengthening of effective assistance of counsel standards
under the Sixth Amendment and under state constitutions.2 1
Other commentators have argued that institutional and fiscal
restraints will not easily yield to judicial review and, therefore, the
system should focus its resources on the most serious criminal
cases,22 or should take other steps to reduce the number of cases
requiring the appointment of counsel or impose parity in funding
for prosecutors and defense counsel. 23 There is also the view that
reliance on "rights" rhetoric and the courts is futile, and that more
fundamental challenges are necessary to protect the Sixth
Amendment rights of the accused.2 4

18. Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Reforming Indigent Defense:
How Free Market Principles Can Help to Fix a Broken System, CATO POLICY
ANALYSIS, No. 666, Sept. 1, 2010 (suggesting that current issues with effective
representation for indigent defendants may be alleviated by allowing indigent
defendants the right to choose their counsel). But see NORMAN LEFSTEIN,
SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE ch. 8

(2011) (looking at three different public defense systems that are successful without
allowing indigent defendants to choose their own attorney).
19. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197 (2013).
20. Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional
Solution to the Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010);
EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY
ISSUE BRIEF: LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE

CRISIS
(2010),
available
at
%20Litigationpercent2OStrategies.pdf.

http//www.acslaw.org/files/Primus%20-

21. LAWRENCE A. BENNER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND
POLICY ISSUE BRIEF: WHEN EXCESSIVE PUBLIC DEFENDER WORKLOADS VIOLATE
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 2-3

(2011),
available
at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/BennerlBExcessivePDWorkloads.pdf,
see
also
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitutionof Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 837-39 (2006) (advocating shifting burdens on ineffectiveness challenges
based on defense resources and placing the burden on prosecutors to show similar
charging and sentencing patterns for similarly situated defendants).
22. Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to
Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2013).

Professor Bibas has

suggested greater parity between funding for prosecutors and defenders and a more
targeted prosecutorial approach that emphasizes quality over quantity. Stephanos
Bibas, Sacrificing Quantity for Quality: Better Focusing Prosecutors' Scarce
Resources, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 138, 138 (2011).
23. Dripps, supra note 7, at 123.
24. See Paul D. Butler, PoorPeople Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
YALE L.J. 2176, 2203-04 (2013) (urging alternative challenges, including jury
nullification, to the criminal justice system and the war on drugs).
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New doctrinal approaches, alternative means of providing
defense services, reforms in the operation of defender offices, and
structural changes in the criminal justice system can help to
vindicate the right to effective assistance of counsel. I make such
a doctrinal argument in this article, but it is unlikely that these
institutional reforms or the weaving of the right to effective
assistance in different constitutional fabric will remove the central
systemic barrier to the right to effective assistance of counsel:
chronic and widespread underfunding and understaffing of
defender and appointed counsel. Regardless of how the Supreme
Court expresses the constitutional principles, and even with a
more focused approach on felonies and serious misdemeanor cases,
unless the courts require adequate funding for indigent defense
programs to enable defense lawyers to provide essential services to
all of their clients, there is little hope that this national crisis will
be more than marginally ameliorated.25
We are not without good models. Funding for federal
defender offices has generally been at a level sufficient to support
high quality representation of indigent defendants in federal
criminal cases. 26 There are also effective state indigent defense
systems that have been developed through a combination of
political independence, dedicated lawyers, high quality training,
supervision, support services, and manageable caseloads.27 On a

25. It is important to note that a lack of resources is not the only systemic
problem which weakens Gideon's promise. Political control of defender offices by
elected officials, a culture of submission by some defenders to the courts and
prosecutors, lack of training and weak commitment to zealous advocacy, and a
fundamental shift in the balance of power in the criminal justice system to
prosecutors all contribute to the undermining of Gideon. See Alexandra Natapoff,
Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049 (2013) (discussing systemic
injustices which individual defenders may be powerless to correct, and concluding
that the presence of defense counsel should not be a proxy for determining that a
trial was fair); David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition,
122 YALE L.J. 2578 (2013) (examining systemic challenges that have been
introduced to the federal system since the introduction of Gideon in 1963);

Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, NationalNeglect: Realizing Justice Through
Transformative Change, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 331 (2010) (giving an
overview of challenges endemic to work as a defender); William J. Stuntz, Plea

Bargaining and Criminal Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548,

2558 (2004) ("And where law does not reign, the district attorney's office generally
does."). I discuss the "political" issues, infra, text accompanying note 108.
26. As noted, supra note 12, federal defender services are in jeopardy as a
result of the stand-off on the federal budget. See also Editorial Board, Justice
Sequestered, N.Y. TIMES,
July
20,
2013,
at
SR10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/2llopinion/sunday/justice-sequestered.html
(discussing the various challenges to the justice system suffered as a result of the
2013 sequester).
27. See Rapping,supra note 25, at 347-48, 350-54.
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daily basis, public defenders are committed to the principle and
practice of zealous advocacy and equal justice, but funding of
indigent defense programs is so seriously deficient, that even the
most dedicated lawyers find themselves on all too frequent
occasions fulfilling the Sixth Amendment requirement in name
only.
In this Article, I set forth a litigation strategy as a means of
confronting the funding and resources issues. Section I details the
scope and depth of the crisis in funding and resources. Section II
addresses the Supreme Court's failure to develop sufficient
remedial doctrines to vindicate a defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel. Section III discusses models of litigation
that might be pursued to deal with the systemic issues, with a
focus on ethical obligations of defenders. Section IV discusses
three cases, currently being litigated in Pennsylvania, that reflect
both the promise and difficulties in finding a litigation response to
these issues.
I.

The Crisis in Real Terms

The national data regarding funding, caseloads, and support
services for public defenders and assigned counsel reflect a
worsening situation in many jurisdictions, and conditions of
representation that make it impossible for many lawyers for
indigent defendants to provide adequate services. At the time
Gideon was decided there were far fewer prosecutions, and only
217,000 persons were incarcerated nationwide.28
By 2012,
defender caseloads had increased to unmanageable levels, fueled
by a system that produces over 12 million arrests a year,2 9 2.3
million persons in custody, and many more on probation or
parole."0
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals recommended that public defender
caseloads not exceed 150 felony cases, 400 misdemeanor cases, or

28. GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 12, at 3.
29. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 2012: TABLE 29,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/29tabledatadecpdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
30. Id.; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2012) (explaining that the
mass incarcerations which have taken place from the 1980s through to the present
are largely the result of the War on Drugs); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole,
Good-Time, Credits and Crowded Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 12 (2013) (showing that the national rate of incarceration
increased from 100 per 100,000 to 724 per 100,000 from the 1970s to 2007).
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200 juvenile filings a year, and only where the defender office had
adequate investigative and support services.
While these
standards have been cited over the years, there is little empirical
data to suggest that a public defender can adequately handle that
large a caseload, and regardless of the situation in 1973, many
believe that these numbers are quite unrealistically high today as
criminal litigation has become far more complicated and both the
direct sanctions and indirect consequences of convictions have
Moreover, the proper benchmark is
become far more serious.
attorney workload as opposed to caseload, since there is a high
differentiation in the time and resources necessary for adequate
representation. The complexity of the case, the experience of the
lawyer, the support services available, and the seriousness of the
consequences if a conviction results are critical factors in any
analysis of defender representation. But regardless of the metrics
used, professional standards are routinely and substantially
exceeded in many jurisdictions.3
Studies of individual systems show shockingly high
caseloads. In Florida, assistant public defenders handle as many
as 500 felonies or 2225 misdemeanors each year.34 From 2004 to
2008, the Miami-Dade County Defender budget was reduced by
over twelve percent while its caseload increased by twenty-nine
percent."
In a recent decision, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the caseload problem in the context of a motion by a
public defender to withdraw from a case where he did not have the
time or resources to provide basic services to his clients. 6 The
court was "struck by the breadth and depth of the evidence of how
the excessive caseload has impacted the Public Defender's

31. NATL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: THE DEFENSE 9-10 (1973); see also
AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS

(Aug. 24, 2007) (on file with the author); Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon's

Promise by Viewing Excessive Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 425-29 (2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Funding Gideon's
Promise]; Heidi Reamer Anderson, Qualitative Assessments of Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 571, 575 (2012) [hereinafter Anderson, Qualitative
Assessments].
32. See Anderson, QualitativeAssessments, supranote 31, at 576-77.
33. Professor Norman Lefstein has urged consideration of "weighted caseloads"
to determine the amount of time defense lawyers need to provide effective
assistance of counsel to all clients. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE
CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 154 (2011). See infra note 86 for
further discussion of studies and developments on caseload data.
34. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at 68.
35. Id.
36. Pub. Defender v. State, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013).
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representation of indigent defendants," and remanded the case for
potentially wide ranging relief:37
Witnesses from the Public Defender's office described "meet
and greet pleas" as being routine procedure. The assistant
public defender meets the defendant for the first time at
arraignment during a few minutes in the courtroom or
hallway and knows nothing about the case except for the
arrest form provided by the state attorney, yet is expected to
The
counsel the defendant about the State's plea offer ....
witnesses also testified that the attorneys almost never visited
the crime scenes, were unable to properly investigate or
interview witnesses themselves, often had other attorneys
conduct their depositions, and were often unprepared to
proceed to trial when the case was called.38
In Georgia, defendants are routinely denied counsel for many
months as they await trial." In Atlanta in 2007, twenty public
defenders had a caseload of 21,000 misdemeanor cases, already an
average of 1050 cases per lawyer, yet the budget was cut that year
in a manner that would increase the caseload to over 2000 cases
per lawyer.40 In Michigan, contract attorneys had caseloads of
over seven hundred cases, and in Detroit, caseloads were reported
to be five to six times higher than the National Advisory
Commission standards, with some defenders spending no more
than approximately thirty minutes on many cases." In Tennessee,
six attorneys handle over ten thousand misdemeanor cases on a
yearly basis, thus allowing about one hour of services for each
case.42 In Missouri in 2010, 368 public defenders handled over
84,000 cases, and a state commission determined that the public
defender system would need more than a thirty percent increase in
43
the number of lawyers to provide adequate services.

37. Id. at 273.
38. Id. at 278.
39. STEPHEN B. BRIGHT & LAUREN SUDEALL LUCAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY ISSUE BRIEF, OVERCOMING DEFIANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL ROLE IN PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN GEORGIA (2010).

40. Heather Baxter, Gideon's Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 356 (2010).
41. Id. at 356-57.
42. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at 68. The situation in Louisiana is even
starker. See Editorial Board, Federal Oversight on Public Defense, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2013, at SR10 (stating that lawyers in New Orleans have on average only
seven minutes to spend on misdemeanor clients and that New Orleans residents
pay on average $367 in taxes annually to support policing but only $2 for public
defense services).
43. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo.
2012) (en banc). Only nine states limit the maximum caseload of defenders, and of
these only two states have adopted regulations that effectively codify these
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In New York, a commission appointed by Chief Judge Judith
Kaye found systemic structural impediments to effective
assistance of counsel:
[Tihe indigent defense system in New York State is both
severely dysfunctional and structurally incapable of providing
each poor defendant with the effective legal representation
that he or she is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution and laws of the State of New
York .... [This] has resulted in a disparate, inequitable, and
ineffective system for securing constitutional guarantees to
those too poor to obtain counsel of their own choosing.
There is not good data with respect to the hours spent by
defenders on their work, but even assuming that many defenders
work ten hour days, weekends included, log as many as 1850-2000
hours on an annual basis," and have a relatively "low" caseload of
three hundred cases, the defender would have approximately six
hours for each case. Furthermore, since some of these cases are
homicides, serious violent felonies, or complicated appeals, and
some are tried to a jury, it is essentially impossible for that
defender to provide adequate assistance-indeed, any assistanceto all of his clients. If as few as fifteen cases are tried to a jury,
with an average of four days of trial time per case, thirty percent
of the defender's time will be expended on five percent of the
caseload. One does not have to be a math major or an expert on
LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., CENSUS OF PUBLIC
requirements.
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES 10 (2010). On a national level,

public defenders receive far less funding than prosecutor offices (which of course
have enormous support from police departments, forensic laboratories, and other
governmental agencies) and that imbalance is only increasing. GIOVANNI & PATEL,
supra note 12, at 4; STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES (2011); Hannah Levintova et al., Charts: Why
You're in Deep Trouble If You Can't Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supremecourt-charts (describing that in 2007, spending for prosecutors nationwide exceeded
that for appointed counsel by $3.5 billion and that in California, spending for
prosecutors was double that by defender offices).
44. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE.OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3 (2006). In one county in New York,
attorneys had annual caseloads of 1000 misdemeanor cases and 175 felony cases,
and even with these crushing assignments, the chief public defender was asked to
prepare for a ten to twelve percent budget reduction. Id. at 18. In this context, the
New York Court of Appeals has ruled that indigent criminal defendants may
challenge the public defender system where public defenders did not communicate
with clients after appointment, took few if any defense efforts following
arraignment, waived important rights, and acted as mere conduits for plea offers.
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 226 (N.Y. 2010). In effect, the court
ruled that this "representation" was no representation at all and that "merely
nominal attorney-client pairings" were unconstitutional. Id.
45. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 18, at 16 (using similar estimates while
discussing defender workload).
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defense services to understand that the lawyer will be spending
almost no time on many of her cases.16
A number of states provide indigent defense services by
appointing private counsel on a case-by-case basis or by issuance
of low-bid contracts. In these jurisdictions, the issue is less one of
case overload, as it is of extremely low compensation schedules. A
survey conducted by the NACDL found an average compensation
rate in thirty states of sixty-five dollars per hour, with some states
These states also
paying as little as forty dollars per hour.
sharply limit payments to investigators, experts, and social
workers, whose assistance may be critical to the defense efforts.
By contrast, the Federal Criminal Justice Act compensates
attorneys appointed for indigent defendants in federal court at the
In
rate of $125 an hour (and $177 for capital appointments).4
many jurisdictions, the rate of pay has remained constant for over
49
twenty years and most jurisdictions impose low "caps" per case.
As the NACDL summarized the impact:
Inadequate compensation restricts the pool of attorneys
willing to represent indigent defendants and threatens the
quality of indigent defense because of perverse economic
incentives. It creates conflicts of interest for attorneys by
encouraging them to limit the amount of work they perform on
a case for an indigent client. A stagnant hourly rate leads to a
decrease in the overall number of attorneys willing to accept
court appointments. More experienced attorneys refuse to
participate in assigned counsel systems that pay hourly rates
far below the market rate. Younger attorneys, who are often

46. Id. at 17. For a statistical analysis of the caseload problem on a national
scale, see Levintova, et al., supra note 43, which warns that caseload
recommendations are exceeded by over forty percent, and that lawyers spend less
than two-thirds of the time necessary for case preparation; LANGTON & FAROLE,
supra note 43 (stating that in 2007 on a national average each public defender
handled 371 cases for the year, or more than one a day).
47. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, RATIONING JUSTICE: THE
UNDERFUNDING OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS 8 (2013).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 111-366, at 905 (2009); see also 7A GUIDELINES FOR
ADMINISTERING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT AND RELATED STATUTES, GUIDE TO
JUDICIARY POLICY ch. 2 § 230.16(a). As the Third Circuit has recently noted, this

hourly fee "is universally recognized as a below-market rate for criminal defense
lawyers." United States v. Konrad, 730 F.3d 343, 351 (3d Cir. 2013).
49. RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 13-14; see also Cyn Yamashiro,
Juvenile Injustice: $350 to Defend a Child, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/29/opinion/la-oe-yamashiro-juvenile-appointedattorneys-20130729 (reporting on the L.A- juvenile justice system and assessing
outcomes in cases where defendants were represented by public defenders, with
adequate resources, and defendants represented by court appointed counsel at a
rate of $350 per case and finding that thirty-four percent of defendants represented
by court appointed counsel ended up with more serious sanctions).
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burdened by student loans, never even consider joining the
defense bar.

II. Standards for Assessing Effectiveness of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington," the Court recognized a right to
effective assistance of counsel, but required the defendant to show
both that counsel failed to engage in representation efforts that a
reasonably competent defense counsel would normally provide,
and that counsel's ineffectiveness caused actual prejudice.52 The
stories of Strickland's manifest shortcomings have been told-and
told well-by many others.
On the issue of whether defense
counsel provided competent representation, the Court adopted a

standard that looked to whether the lawyer's performance was
"reasonablelU under prevailing professional norms."" The Court
warned against "hindsight" judgments or critiques and ruled that
courts should "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."5
Under this test, if the defense lawyer can point to any rational
basis for her trial strategy, she will be deemed to have provided
effective assistance. Justice Marshall's view that effectiveness
should be judged from the viewpoint of whether the lawyer
actually took all of the steps required of defense lawyers by
prevailing standards was rejected, thus leaving the inquiry
without objective standards.5 6
Regarding the prejudice prong, no relief would be ordered
unless the defendant could show that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors" there was a "reasonable probability
that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different."

50. RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 47 at 15-16.

Equally troubling are low

salaries for public defenders, lack of parity with prosecutors, and low-bid contracts
for defense services, where private firms agree to represent indigent clients for a
flat annual fee, where the funds are almost always insufficient to provide
competent counsel. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance
and ResistanceAfter Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2166 (2013).
51. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
52. Id. at 686.
53. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11.
54. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
55. Id. at 689.
56. Id. at 716-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This dissent mirrors in part the
approach urged by Judge Bazelon in United States v. DeCoster,487 F.2d 1197 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), a ruling vacated by an en banc court in United States v. DeCoster, 624
F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Judge Bazelon urged that a presumption of prejudice
should be found where a lawyer did not adhere to certain specific duties necessary
in virtually all cases. Id. at 1203-04.
57. Strickland, 466 U.S at 694.
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The ineffectiveness of counsel must be such that a court finds that
"confidence in the outcome" has been undermined."
Prejudice
would be presumed only in those rare cases in which no counsel
was present or in which the lawyer was forced to provide
representation in circumstances evidencing a direct conflict of
interest.5 9
The Strickland standards have proven to be highly forgiving,
as the courts routinely reject ineffectiveness of counsel claims
based on supposed (and often highly strained) "strategic" decisions
made by trial counsel.6 0 Even where counsel's performance has
been plainly below professional norms, relief is often denied on the
ground that said counsel's errors were not prejudicial.6 ' Equally
problematic, the Strickland test appears to render irrelevant
systemic or structural limits on counsel's performance, such as
high caseloads, even though structural deficiencies are
attributable to the state, while individual attorney error in a
particular case may not be.
The deterrent impact of the case-by-case post-conviction
review process is too slight to remedy systemic deficiencies. First,
application of the prejudice component insulates a significant
number of cases with proven ineffectiveness from judicial relief.
Second, many cases (specifically those that result in short prison
sentences or probation) will not be subject to judicial review since
almost all jurisdictions require that the challenge to counsel's
performance be made on post-conviction proceedings, following the
58. Id. at 694.
59. Id. at 692; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 684, 659 (1984)
(rejecting a "no prejudice" test except where there was a "complete denial of
counsel" or in circumstances amounting to a similar total denial).
60. See, e.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that
defense counsel was not ineffective when in trial, counsel failed to explain or
challenge their own expert's changed testimony which undermined the defense
mitigation strategy, placed a witness on the stand without knowing the content of
his testimony, and made no argument against the imposition of the death penalty);
Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (holding that defense
counsel did not provide ineffective assistance when he failed to introduce good
character evidence).
61. See, e.g., Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding a
death sentence where defendant's lawyer drank a quart of vodka every day during
trial and was under the stress of imminent prosecution for stealing client funds);
Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) ("The Strickland inquiry
into counsel's effectiveness ex post should be supplement[ed] by an ex ante inquiry
into whether the defense [was] institutionally equipped to litigate as effectively as
the prosecution."); Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 927, 950 (2013) (discussing Strickland being "at war with itself," and
examining new empirical data on the failure of the "prejudice" analysis by many
courts).
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end of the direct appeal process.6 2 There is little incentive for a
defendant to challenge a conviction where the sentence has
already been served; indeed, in many states, and as a matter of
federal habeas corpus review, there is no post-conviction
jurisdiction where the sentence has been fully served.63 Third,
there is no federal right to appointed counsel on post-conviction
review, and even where states provide counsel at this stage, there
is no right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.6
Fourth, a significant number of ineffectiveness challenges are
made in federal habeas corpus proceedings, and as the Supreme
Court has emphasized, under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) standards, a court must give
"double" deference to a state court's rejection of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel." Finally, even if the Strickland
test were replaced by a more demanding standard, it is highly
doubtful that the reversal rate would increase sufficiently to cause
jurisdictions to increase funding or institute other measures to
ensure more effective representation.

62. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grant, 821 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2003).
63. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (denying defendant's habeas
corpus petition).
64. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that the "right to
appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further"). The
Supreme Court has ruled that the failure of post-conviction counsel to provide
effective assistance on the first post-conviction opportunity by asserting
ineffectiveness of trial or direct appeal counsel will excuse procedural defaults
caused by prior counsel's ineffectiveness for federal habeas purposes. Martinez v.
Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). The impact of Martinez on right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is subject to debate. See Alper, supra note 7 (discussing the
need for counsel in ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims); Eric M.
Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction
Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591 (2013)
(explaining the need for appropriate representation throughout the legal process
for those facing the death penalty); Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance
After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2431 (2013) ("[The] effort to expand habeas
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Martinez ... will make little
difference in either the enforcement of the right to ... effective assistance of
counsel or the provision of competent representation in state criminal cases.").
65. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (describing habeas corpus
as a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems");
see also Michael M. O'Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance
Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompetence, 25
FED. SENT'G REP. 110 (2012) (discussing Supreme Court effective assistance
jurisprudence in habeas and non-habeas contexts). Even in capital cases, where
the Court has at times imposed higher standards in assessing effectiveness of
counsel, for instance in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) and Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the higher rate of reversals has not resulted in
significant changes in funding practices. See infra Part IV(A).
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III. Is There an Effective Strategy?
In addressing systemic underfunding of public defenders and
appointed counsel for the indigent, various strategies may have
utility, including the use of innovative constitutional theories, the
restructuring of defense services and criminal case disposition
processes, and the reform of substantive criminal law doctrine.
Unless the courts are willing to compel the governmental funders
to provide adequate resources, however, even the most elegant
constitutional theories will remain a matter of theory, not political
reality. Furthermore, restructuring and similar reforms that
might reduce the number of cases in the system is unlikely to
ensure adequate funding for defense services, as many
legislatures, left to their own devices, will reduce funding for
public defenders if caseloads are decreased.66
Litigation challenging systemic faults has been successful in
some jurisdictions, but these successes have been too few and too
limited in remedial measures to effectuate broad-based changes in
the funding and operation of defender services.67 As a result, some
commentators and practitioners have become pessimistic about
judicial intervention and now urge alternative approaches.68 I
understand these responses, and I do not underestimate the
doctrinal, procedural, and political hurdles that a litigation
strategy must overcome. However, properly presented, challenges
66. Indeed, a number of proposals for restructuring the criminal justice system
could place even greater demands on defense counsel. See STEPHANOs BIBAS, THE
MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129-56 (2012). Limits on plea bargaining by
their very nature will require more trials, contested motions, and the need for wellprepared defense counsel. The Supreme Court's recent rulings on effectiveness of
counsel in the plea negotiation process, while limited in scope, place a useful focus
on links between the right to counsel, fair plea processes, and pre-trial discovery.
See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An
Innovative EmpiricalStudy of Plea Bargaining'sInnocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013) (using empirical evidence to show issues with and discuss
the extent of plea bargaining's innocence problem); Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the
Plea BargainingProcess, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 562 (2013) (viewing Lafler and Frye
as chances to "police equality of sentences for the guilty and mandate better
investigation of the underlying offense to ferret out the innocent"); see, e.g., Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (holding in relevant part that the proper
remedy for counsel's ineffective assistance is to order the prosecutor to reoffer the
plea agreement); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2010) (holding that
failure to inform a client whether their plea carries a risk of deportation is grounds
for alleging constitutional deficiency of counsel).
67. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation,
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 427, 428-58 (2009) (discussing challenges faced
in earlier cases).
68. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 7, at 119-31 (arguing that the "[aidvocates of
the rights of the accused ... and of the right to counsel" should not expect judicial
intervention but suggests an alternative approach to the problem).
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to the core flaws in institutional defense systems are capable of
effectuating some necessary changes in the delivery of defense
services."
Prospective relief should be available on a showing of
structural or other across-the-board barriers to the provisions of
effective representation. The New York Court of Appeals has
permitted a class action to proceed on allegations that lack of
funding for defender services in local jurisdictions has resulted in
a systemic failure to provide legal representation to indigent
criminal defendants at critical stages of the proceedings." As the
court ruled:
Wrongful convictions, however, are not the only injustices that
command our present concern. As plaintiffs rightly point out,
the absence of representation at critical stages is capable of
causing grave and irreparable injury to persons who will not
be convicted. Gideon's guarantee to the assistance of counsel
does not turn upon a defendant's guilt or innocence, and
neither can the availability of a remedy for its denial.
"A structural challenge," as the Iowa Supreme Court
explained, "involves a realistic assessment of whether the state
has provided an adequate framework for ensuring that the right to
counsel is realized in cases involving indigent defense."
This
reasoning is particularly true where violations are structural,
systemic, and tend to produce omissions by lawyers rather than
obvious errors of commission. In such circumstances, plaintiffs
69. See Drinan, supra note 67, at 462-77 (discussing relevant general litigation
strategies).
70. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 217 (N.Y. 2010); see also Wilbur
v. Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2012 WL 600727, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23,
2012) ("The Court finds that case-by-case requests for new counsel, appeals, and/or
malpractice actions would not resolve the systemic problems identified by
plaintiffs, making a request for injunctive and declaratory relief necessary.").
71. Hurrell-Harring,930 N.E.2d at 227.
72. Simmons v. State Pub. Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Iowa 2010); see also
Lavallee v. Justices in Hamden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 904 (Mass. 2004),
New York Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376, 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002) ("[Tihe [pre-trial] claim of ineffectiveness is ultimately concerned with the
fairness of the process as a whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome
of the case."); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 787 (La. 1993). The Superior Court of
Washington later concluded that:
Harm is not limited to locking up innocent people.
The accused is
prejudiced if he or she is forced to plead guilty rather than run the risk of
going to trial without competent counsel or if counsel doesn't bother to call
witnesses who can support the accused, or when the accused must
evaluate the pros and cons of a plea offer without competent counsel to
explain the plea and its consequences or when counsel doesn't bother to
move to suppress inadmissible evidence.
Best v. Grant Cnty., No. 04-2-00189-0, slip op. at 8 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 14,
2004).
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must satisfy the traditional requirements for the grant of
equitable relief. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
This [Strickland] standard is inappropriate for a [claim]
seeking prospective relief. The [S]ixth [A]mendment protects
rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus,
deficiencies that do not meet the "ineffectiveness" standard
may nonetheless violate a defendant's rights under the [Silxth
[A]mendment ....
Whether an accused has been prejudiced
by the denial of a right is an issue that relates to reliefwhether the defendant is entitled to have his or her conviction
overturned-rather than to the question of whether such a
right exists and can be protected prospectively . . .. Where a
party seeks to overturn his or her conviction, powerful
considerations warrant granting this relief only where that
defendant has been prejudiced.... These considerations do
not apply when only prospective relief is sought.7
The supreme courts of Florida and Missouri have recently
charted new paths for assessing claims of ineffectiveness based on
evidence of high caseloads and lack of attorney resources. In
Florida, the state supreme court ruled that a public defender could
seek to withdraw from current cases and to refuse future
appointments in non-capital felony cases on the grounds that
excessive caseloads and underfunding interfered with its legal and
ethical obligations to its clients.7 4 The State of Florida had, by
statute, barred defender offices from withdrawing from cases on
the ground that their caseloads were too high or their funding was
too low to provide effective assistance of counsel, but the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that Sixth Amendment rights of defendants,
and ethical obligations of attorneys, permitted withdrawal or
refusal of new appointments if the caseloads and funding
prevented defender offices from providing effective assistance of
counsel.
The court permitted this challenge to caseloads and funding
in the pre-trial context and ruled that the Strickland postconviction test for assessing effectiveness of trial counsel was not
the sole means of enforcing Sixth Amendment rights.7 6 The court
73. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (11th Cir. 1988). Luckey was
eventually dismissed on Younger abstention grounds. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d
673, 674 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36 (1971) (Younger
abstention doctrine). In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) the Supreme
Court noted that the harm resulting from the constitutional violation (unlawful
detention) would not likely be grounds for reversal on appeal and therefore ordered
prospective relief of a forty-eight hour probable cause determination after
warrantless arrests to remedy the systemic violation.
74. Pub. Defender v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 261 (Fla. 2013).
75. Id. at 266-70.
76. Id. at 276.
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also rejected arguments that resolution of this issue was a
legislative matter and that the courts could not remedy
constitutional violations by ordering funding or reductions in
Aggregate or systemic relief was appropriate in
caseloads."
circumstances where a defender could show that extremely high
caseloads posed "a substantial risk that representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
Allegations that felony
responsibilities to another client."78
caseloads were in the range of four hundred cases per year and
that the number of cases had increased by twenty-nine percent
over a period of three years, while at the same time the defender
budget was cut by over twelve percent, were sufficient to establish
this "substantial risk."79
The Missouri Supreme Court has also permitted a public
defender to withdraw from a case in which he was appointed
pursuant to statewide administrative protocols on defender
caseloads and processes for withdrawal from cases.o As the court
framed the issue, "whether the duty of public defenders to provide
a defense ... requires them to accept a judge's appointment ... no
matter the size of their existing caseload and their ability to
provide effective representation to their existing or additional
clients . . . ."8 The court expressly rejected the Strickland test in
deciding whether a lawyer's ethical and constitutional obligations
to provide effective assistance of counsel are compromised by
caseloads too large to offer anything more than pro forma
Specifically, under the state's rules of
representation.8 2
professional conduct, there is an independent duty to provide
effective assistance in criminal cases, and an impermissible
conflict of interest arises where the public defender is compelled by
caseload considerations to "choose between the rights of [her]
various indigent" clients. 3 The court further made clear that
these ethical obligations provide important "parallel" standards in
assessing the constitutional duties of public defenders." As the
court stated:
77. Id. at 279-82.
78. Id. at 275 (citing Fla. Bar Rule 4-1.7(a)(2)).
79. Id. at 273.
80. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 593-94
(Mo. 2012) (en banc).
81. Id. at 605.
82. Id. at 588.
83. Id. at 608.
84. Id. (citing State ex rel. Kinder v. McShane, 87 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Mo. 2002)
(en bane).
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No exception exists to the ethics rule for lawyers who
represent indigent persons. To the contrary, as the American
Bar Association has aptly noted, there is an "implicit premise
that governments, which establish and fund providers of
public defense, never intended that the lawyers who furnish
the representation would be asked to do so if it meant
violating their ethical duties pursuant to professional conduct
rules."
For this reason, "public defenders are risking their own
professional lives" when appointed to an excessive number of
86
cases.
A federal district court followed a similar route in finding
that the public defense systems of two cities in the State of
Washington failed to provide the assistance of counsel required by
the Sixth Amendment."
The court ruled that on a pre-trial
challenge the Strickland standard was not applicable; rather, the
issue was whether injunctive relief was necessary to remedy
systemic deprivations of assistance of counsel that created the
substantial risk that the prosecution's case would not be subjected
to "meaningful adversarial testing."' As the court stated:
The point here is that the system is broken to such an extent
that confidential attorney/client communications are rare, the
individual defendant is not represented in any meaningful
way, and actual innocence could conceivably go unnoticed and
unchampioned. Advising a client to take a fantastic plea deal
in an obstruction of justice or domestic violence case may
85. Id. at 608 (citing AM. BAR AsS'N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE
RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 11 (2009)).
86. Id. (citing State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d
870, 880 (Mo. 2009)). In the wake of the Florida and Missouri supreme court
rulings, both states are engaged in workload and caseload studies to attempt to
quantify the appropriate case-weighted caseload for public defenders. The initial
Missouri report develops data-supported workload standards designed to inform
the inquiry into maximum workloads for defenders. AM. BAR AsS'N STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY
OF THE MISSOURI DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS
(2014), availableat http//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal-aid
indigentLdefendants/2014/1s_sclaid 5c themissouri-project-report.authcheckdam.
pdf. In Texas, as of 2014, public defenders are required by statute to maintain data
for caseload studies, and guidelines for refusing appointments have been adopted.
H.B. 1318, 83rd Sess. (Tex. 2013) (describing the appointment of counsel to
represent certain youths and indigent defendants and counsel's duties). Careful
studies will be critical to the adoption of appropriate caseload limits.
87. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon (Wilbur II), No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL
6275319, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2013).
88. Id. at *5. Because the case had originally been filed in state court, but was
removed by the defendant cities to the federal district court, there were no Younger
abstention bars to federal jurisdiction. Previously, the Eleventh Circuit had
dismissed a similar lawsuit on abstention grounds, but there the case was filed as
an original federal matter. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 673-74 (11th Cir. 1992).
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appear to be effective advocacy, but not if the client is
innocent, the charge is defective, or the plea would have
disastrous consequences for his or her immigration status. It
is the lack of a representational relationship that would allow
counsel to evaluate and protect the client's interests that
makes the situation in Mount Vernon and Burlington so
troubling 8and gives rise to the Sixth Amendment violation in
this case.
Applying this standard, the court found that the indigent
systems "systematically deprived" defendants of the assistance of
counsel at critical stages and did so as a result of massive
caseloads and too few attorneys.90 For several years, two part-time
lawyers were each handling approximately one thousand cases. 91
They spent less than an hour on each case, and in the
overwhelming majority did nothing more than "meet and plead"
their clients on the day of trial.9 2 Remarkably, even after the filing
of the lawsuit, and with new counsel retained by the cities, very
few clients were interviewed before their
little changed:
appearance in court, one lawyer spoke to only three or four
witnesses over an entire year, files lacked any record of legal
research, and in 2012 there was evidence of only one pre-trial
motion and only five or six actual trials.93
The court refused to order "hard" caseload caps, but imposed
a number of requirements designed to ensure that lawyers for
indigents accused of crimes had sufficient time and resources to
conduct the normal defense functions, starting with confidential
client interviews, and thereafter necessary investigation,
discovery, research, motion practice, counseling on disposition
options, and trials where appropriate.94
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
relevance of state ethical rules, a lawyer's professional judgments
and obligations, and American Bar Assocation (ABA) professional
standards in defining ineffectiveness of counsel doctrine.95 The

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Wilbur II, at *4.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.

94. Id. at *9-12.
95. E.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (holding that the ABA
Standards are "important guides" on the ineffective counsel issue); Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (quoting the ABA Standards to describe defense
counsel obligations); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (looking to the
ABA guidelines to determine acceptable conduct for capital defense counsel); see
also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, KEEPING DEFENDER
WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 4 (2001) (explaining how public defenders often fail to
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Court has also stressed that in deciding whether alleged conflicts
of interest render a lawyer ineffective, substantial deference
should be given to a lawyer's judgment regarding the impact, if
any, of a potential or even a real conflict of interest. 96
The ABA addressed this issue in 2006 and advised that
lawyers must make the judgment of whether workloads prevent
them from fulfilling their ethical obligations of competent
representation. The ABA stated:
If a lawyer believes that her workload is such that she is
unable to meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in
the representation of a client, she must not continue the
representation of that client or, if representation has not yet
begun, she must decline the representation ....

When an

existing workload does become excessive, the lawyer must
reduce it to the extent that what remains to be done can be
handled in full compliance with the Rules.
In Nix v. Whiteside,98 the Court rejected a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel made by a defendant who argued that
his lawyer improperly persuaded him not to testify in support of
his claim of self-defense where the lawyer believed that such
testimony would be false." The lawyer told the defendant that if
he insisted on testifying, he would inform the court that it
constituted peijury, would impeach him, and would withdraw from
representation.'xo A majority of the Court found that the lawyer's
conduct was not ineffective under "accepted norms of professional
conduct," as a defendant has no right to present false testimony.a1
The concurring opinion properly questioned the lawyer's "judging"
of his client's proposed testimony (a belated statement that the
victim was armed) as false,'0 2 but whatever the merits of the
Court's ruling, a key point in Nix is the strong deference provided

acknowledge the conflict of interest caused by excessive caseloads). Cf Bobby v.
Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8 n.1 (2009) (arguing that the ABA standards are not
controlling norms under Sixth Amendment).
96. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978) ("An 'attorney ... is in
the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of
interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.'" (quoting State v.
Davis, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Ariz. 1973))).
97. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, 4-5
(2006) (discussing the "Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Who Represent Indigent
Criminal Defendants When Excessive Caseloads Interfere with Competent and
Diligent Representation").
98. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
99. Id. at 184-88.
100. Id. at 161.
101. Id. at 171.
102. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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to lawyers in making reasonable judgments regarding their
professional obligations.'03
The combination of the Supreme Court's recognition of
defense counsel's ethical judgments, the ABA standards, and the
rules of professional responsibility' provide persuasive support
for the constitutionally based proposition that public defenders
must manage their caseloads to avoid the inherent and destructive
conflicts that arise when a defender has an excessive number of
cases. 105 If a lawyer can properly refuse to present a defense on the
good faith judgment that the presentation of such testimony would
be false and thus impermissible under the rules of professional
conduct, a lawyer's similar good faith judgment 'that she cannot
represent more clients than her time and resources allow for
competent and zealous representation should also carry strong
weight on the Sixth Amendment conflict question.
Consideration of ethical and professional obligations in
assessing effectiveness of counsel is consistent with the rulings in
Strickland and Cuyler v. Sullivan.'0 6 To the degree that excessive
caseloads present conflicts of interest for the public defender,
which are similar in impact to the conflicts of interest created by
joint representation of clients with conflicting interests, the Cuyler
v. Sullivan test is appropriate. The dangers of an excessive
caseload are likely to cause a lawyer to act outside of her
professional obligations, and post-trial remedies will likely be
illusory as the errors will often be that of omission due to lack of
time and resources. Moreover, to the extent that excessive
caseloads are seen as structural and thus equivalent to cases in
which lawyers do not act as adversaries to the prosecution,

103. I recognize that the assertion of ethical restraints on caseloads requires
defender offices (or individual defenders) to challenge practices that have been
established by the local government or court system, and such challenges may
create risks for those who make these challenges. See infra notes 190-194 and
accompanying text. But to the extent the courts recognize the ethical basis for such
actions, it may be that more defenders will take the risks that are inherent in this
litigation.
104. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to provide
"competent" representation, require "diligence" in representation matters, provide
"communications" with clients, and to avoid of conflicts of interest. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7, & 1.8 (1983). Under the Rules, a conflict of

interest exists if there is a "significant risk" that representation of another client
will "materially limit" the lawyer's representation of another client. Id. at 1.7 &
cmt.
105. See Anderson, Funding Gideon'sPromise, supra note 31, at 442-44, 448-56.
106. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669-71, 687-91 (1984); Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-48 (1980).
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prejudice may be presumed.
Finally, from the angle of
deference, judicial respect of a lawyer's judgment as to the dangers
of excessive caseloads is supported by Cuyler, Strickland, and the
presumption that the defense lawyer is acting in a professionally
responsible manner...
Of course, even if this doctrinal approach supports structural
remedial relief, there is no guarantee that public defenders will
challenge their own practices and caseloads or that the courts will
use these remedial powers to compel state and local governments
to expend the necessary resources for defender services. On the
issue of legal challenges, political control of defender offices by
state governments, and a culture of accepting all case
appointments regardless of the consequences on effective
representation are harsh realities in many defender offices.1"
Assuming that legal challenges are brought, where serious
constitutional violations can be remedied only by intrusive orders,
courts are often hesitant to intervene, but in some cases have done
so. Thus, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed an order
requiring the release of 46,000 inmates from the California prison
system based on evidence of persistent and pervasive patterns of
cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, including serious
overcrowding and the denial of necessary medical services to large
numbers of inmates.1 o Whether the courts will respond to the
national crisis in indigent defense with remedial orders for
adequate funding remains to be seen.

107. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1016-18 (11th Cir. 1988); Benner,
supra note 21, at 2-3. The Court has stressed the defense lawyer's obligation to act
as an advocate by testing the state's case. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204
(1979).
108. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669, 689-91; Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 346-47. As
Professor Anderson also notes, the conflict created by excessive caseloads is entirely
a product of government policy and is structural in nature. Anderson, Funding
Gideon'sPromise, supra note 31, at 453-54.
109. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at 80-84. ABA Formal Op. 06-441, supra
note 97, permits and may require legal challenges to excessively high caseloads.
110. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011). On August 2, 2013, the Court
denied an application for a stay of the injunction, thus requiring the release of the
final group of ten thousand inmates. Lyle Denniston, No Delay of PrisonerRelease,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://scotusblog.com/2013/08/no-delay-ofprisoner-release/; see also Ass'n of Surrogates v. State of New York, 969 F.2d 1416,
1417-18 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the court has the power to order the state to
fund constitutionally mandated services). The United States Department of Justice
has recently urged a federal district court to appoint a monitor to assist in
developing constitutional standards for funding of a defender office in Washington
State, if the court finds that current funding violates the Sixth Amendment. See
Statement of Interest of the United States at 7, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon,
No. 11-1100RSL, 2012 WL 600727 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2012).
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IV. The Pennsylvania Experience
To illustrate both the promise and difficulties of litigation, I
discuss three cases in Pennsylvania in which targeted efforts are
currently underway to address varying manifestations of
ineffective defense services."'
A.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. McGarrell: The
Crisis in CapitalRepresentation

Pennsylvania is the only state that has no state funding for
defender services.112 Each county is responsible for funding
prosecutorial and defense functions, and each is fully autonomous
in terms of the structure, compensation rates, and operation of
programs for indigent defense services." 3 In all counties except
Philadelphia, a public defender office, with a chief defender
appointed by county-elected officials, handles the large majority of
Private counsel is
appointed cases for indigent defendants.'
appointed on a case-by-case basis in conflict matters.
In Philadelphia County, the Defender Association of
Philadelphia, a highly regarded and well-staffed defender office
with a current lawyer component of over 240 lawyers (and full
investigative and social work staffs) handles approximately eighty
percent of the indigent defense appointments in misdemeanor and
non-homicide felony cases."'
111. I am co-counsel in two of these cases (McGarrell and Flora) and, as
President of the Board of Directors of the Defender Association of Philadelphia, a
'client" in the third set of cases discussed below. Some of the factual observations
in this section are based on my experience litigating issues related to the right to
effective assistance of counsel and familiarity with the Defender Association of
Philadelphia.
112. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at 54. In 2009 only Utah and Pennsylvania
had no state funding; since that time Utah has provided state funding. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-32-701 (West 2011) (establishing a state fund for indigent defense).
113. John Rudolph, PennsylvaniaPublic Defenders Rebel Against Crushing Case
Loads,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Oct.
23,
2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/pennsylvania-public-defenders n
1556192.html.
114. Id.
115. See Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 633 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, J.,
concurring); James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the
Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE
L.J. 154, 161 (2012); Samantha Melamed, 50 Years After Establishing a Right to
Counsel, Is Justice Still Being Served, PHILA. CITY PAPER (March 14, 2013),
A major reason for the
http://www.citypaper.net/newsffippingtheScales.html.
success of the Defender Association of Philadelphia is its structured independence
from the political process in Philadelphia.
The Association is a non-profit
corporation that contracts with the City of Philadelphia to provide defense services
and is controlled by an independent board of directors. History, DEFENDER Ass'N
OF PHILA., http://www.philadefender.org/history.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).

2014

THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY

395

Historically, private counsel was appointed in all homicide
cases.116 In 1993, the court adopted a protocol under which the
Defender Association was appointed for indigent homicide
defendants in twenty percent of homicide cases."' As part of this
process, the Defender Association created a homicide unit, staffed
by its most experienced lawyers, investigators, social workers, and
mitigation specialists. Over the past twenty years, this unit has
received funding sufficient to permit the assignment of two
attorneys and necessary support services in every case, with
manageable caseloads that permitted expenditure of hundreds
(and sometimes thousands) of hours in homicide case preparation
and trial. By contrast, private defense lawyers assigned to capital
cases were being paid a flat fee of $1800 for all pre-trial
proceedings and preparation for trial, but only $1333 if the case
was resolved by a guilty plea."' At trial, lead counsel was
compensated at a rate of $400 per day. Mitigation counsel was
paid $1700 for pre-trial proceedings and preparation, and $200 per
day at trial."9
These rates for capital representation were among the lowest
in the nation. 2 0 Appointed counsel who properly prepared and
litigated capital cases and expended the hundreds of hours
necessary to provide effective assistance of counsel, were often

Thus, while funding for the operation of the office comes from the City of
Philadelphia, there has been a strong tradition established of independence and
zealous representation. For a history of the early struggle for independence, see In
re Defender Ass'n of Phila., 307 A.2d. 906 (Pa. 1973). For studies on the
comparative effectiveness of assigned counsel, defenders, and private defense
lawyers, see THOMAS H. COHEN, WHO'S BETTER AT DEFENDING CRIMINALS? DOES
TYPE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY MATTER IN TERMS OF PRODUCING FAVORABLE CASE

OUTCOMES (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1876474; Yamashiro,
supra note 49.
116. Joseph A. Slobodzian & Nancy Phillips, Philadelphia Defendants with
Court-Appointed Lawyers Fare Worse in Murder Trials, Study Says, PHILLY.COM,
(Dec. 18,
2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-12-18/news/30531398_1_courtappointed-lawyers-murder-trials-public-defenders.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Commonwealth v. McGarrell (McGarrellII), 57 A.3d 639 (Pa. 2012); see
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MODIFIED GUARANTEED FEE SYSTEM

(PHILADELPHIA COUNTY) TRIAL DIVISION ATTORNEY PAYMENT VOUCHER (2009),
available at http://www.courts.phila.gov/pdflforms/criminal/30-1084D-CP-TrialDivision-Attorney-Payment-Voucher-and-Instructions.pdf.
120. See JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
DEFENDER SERVICES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES UPDATE ON
THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
CASES
27-28
(2010),
available
at

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/
FDPC201O.pdf
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working for less than fifteen dollars an hour. Lawyers who
expended the necessary time in the preparation and trial of
homicide cases, notwithstanding the low rates of compensation,
did so at significant financial costs. In many instances, lawyers
failed to devote sufficient time and resources to their cases, and a
large number of convictions were later overturned on
ineffectiveness of counsel grounds.121 Further, many lawyers
refused to take these appointments, as they could not afford to
spend the necessary time and resources.122 This left a group of
lawyers who often provided no more than marginal representation,
and the lack of lawyers created a significant backlog of capital
cases.1
There was also a dramatic discrepancy in outcomes based on
whether a homicide defendant was represented by a public
defender or private counsel. A Rand Institute study determined
that public defenders had a murder conviction rate nineteen
percent lower than private counsel, a life sentence rate sixty-two
percent lower than private counsel, and an overall reduction of
prison sentence time by twenty-four percent. 124 Indeed, over the
past twenty years in fifteen hundred cases of Defender Association
representation, no Defender client has been sentenced to death.125
A legal challenge to this system was filed in the state
supreme court on behalf of three persons with pending capital
charges who were represented by appointed counsel, on the ground
that the capital defense fee schedule was so inadequate that it
established a presumption that court-appointed counsel would not
provide effective assistance.126 The court granted the request of
121. Thomas G. Saylor, DistinguishedJurist in Residence Lecture: Death Penalty
Stewardship and the Current State of Pennsylvania Capital Jurisprudence, 23
WIDENER L.J. 1 (2013); see also Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 634-35 (Pa.
2012) (Saylor, J., concurring) (stating that the attorney in this case was not given
enough resources to properly defend the defendant). Cf Martinez-Macias v.
Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing conviction on ineffectiveness
grounds and stating that at a rate of $11.84 an hour for capital counsel, "the justice
system got what it paid for").
122. See Report and Recommendations at 9, McGarrell II [hereinafter Lerner
Report], available at httpJ/www.atlanticcenter.org/images/LernerReport.pdf.
123. Id. at 2-3, 13-14.
124. Slobodzian & Phillips, supra note 116.
125. Anderson & Heaton, supra note 115, 183 n.73; see also TERANCE D. MIETHE,
ESTIMATES OF TIME SPENT IN CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL MURDER CASES: A

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA FROM CLARK COUNTY DEFENSE A'IORNEYS
(2012), available at httpJ/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
ClarkNVCostReport.pdf (detailing the amount of time spent on capital cases as
compared to non-capital murder cases).
126. Commonwealth v. McGarrell (McGarrellI), Nos. 77-79 EM 2011 (Pa. Sept.
28, 2011).
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extraordinary jurisdiction and ordered an evidentiary hearing in
the state trial court. 2 7
The trial court issued a Report and Recommendations finding
that the "existing compensation system unacceptably increases the
risk

of ineffective

assistance

of counsel . . . and

is primarily

responsible for the [court's] growing inability to attract a sufficient
number of qualified attorneys willing to accept court appointments
in capital cases."" The court ruled that a showing of defects in
the system "so extreme as to cause structural defects that tainted
the entire mechanism of his trial and sentencing" could be
sufficient to reverse the usual presumption of effectiveness. 29
The court determined that the fee schedule was "grossly
inadequate"' when compared to the enormous preparation time
necessary for preparation and trial of capital cases. 121 Further,
the capital fee schedule increased the risk of ineffectiveness of
counsel by "maintaining a compensation system which punishes
counsel for handling these cases correctly and awards them only if
they take every case to trial without adequate preparation or the
The court
exploration of appropriate non-trial options."132
recommended an hourly fee of ninety dollars for court appointed
counsel. 3
In response, the Administrative Judge of the Court of
Common Pleas increased the flat fee to $10,000 for lead counsel
($7,500 for mitigation counsel) with trial time compensated on a
$400 per day basis, but only after the first five full days of trial.'3u
Thereafter, on a remand of the case from the state supreme court,
the trial court reversed ground and found that the new fee
schedule was not clearly inadequate, that sufficient numbers of
lawyers were willing to accept appointments, and that a "flat fee"
does not present an inherent conflict of interest for the appointed
lawyer.135

127. Id.
128. Lerner Report, supra note 122, at 2.
129. Id. at 7 (citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 192-93 (Pa. 2010)).
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id.
134. Compensation for Conflict Capital Case Representation, Admin. Order No.
1 of 2013 (First Judicial Dist. of Penn. Admin. Governing Bd., Jan. 17, 2013),
available at http://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/regs/2013/AGB-Administrative-Order01-2013a.pdf [hereinafter Compensation for Conflict Capital Case Representation].
135. Updated Report and Recommendations, Commonwealth v. McGarrell
(McGarrellIII), 2014 WL 1226001 (Nos. 77-79 EM 2011) (Pa. Mar. 14, 2014).

398

Law and Inequality

Vol. 32:371

The opinion on remand reflected a questionable shift in focus
from the question of what fees are necessary to ensure competent
representation at trial, to the issue of what fees are necessary to
attract a sufficient number of lawyers to represent capital
defendants and thereby speed up disposition of capital cases. The
court assumed that the new fee schedule would attract lawyers
who would provide effective assistance, notwithstanding that the
new schedule provided less funding than the same court had
previously recommended."
Moreover, the court accepted a flat fee structure that has
been seriously questioned by the ABA, state courts, and
commentators.13 National legal ethics expert, Professor Lawrence
J. Fox, addressed this issue:
In accordance with the Rules of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer may only undertake a court-appointed capital defense
representation if she believes that she will be able to provide
the high quality competent and diligent representation
required for such serious matters. When a lawyer is forced to
proceed with a capital defense matter with a limited budget,
the lawyer does not have the luxury of making this balancing
decision ex ante. The lawyer must work every day knowing
that the financial demands of life and legal practice may
ultimately force her
to choose between
working
uncompensated on a capital case and working to keep the
lights running in her office.1as
On appeal from the trial court's ruling, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, discontinued
"oversight" of the fee issue.' 39 The dissenting Justices protested
that the systemic problems of funding indigent defense services
continued and that "Pennsylvania's capital punishment regime is
The dissent also argued that the flat fee approach
in disrepair."'
was flawed and that there was still abundant evidence of "chronic
underfunding that has debilitated the system to date."14 '

136. Id.
137. The Kansas Supreme Court found that flat fee agreements presented an
actual conflict of interest as this arrangement pits the client's interests against the
lawyer's interest in doing "no more than what is minimally necessary to qualify for
the flat payment." State v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318, 340 (Kan. 2013). Flat fees are
presumed improper by the ABA. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 9.1.B (rev. ed.

2003); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARv. L. REV. 2463, 2477 (2004) (citations omitted).
138. Fox Affidavit at 8-9, Commonwealth v. McGarrell (McGarrellII), 57 A.3d
639 (Pa. 2012) (Nos. 77-79 EM 2011) (Affidavit on file with author).

139. McGarrell III.
140. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (McCaffery, J., dissenting).
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Litigation of the Philadelphia capital case fee schedule has
thus far produced mixed results. The courts have recognized that
egregiously low fees for appointed counsel will inevitably result in
ineffective counsel, and as a result the courts have increased
compensation for appointed counsel. 14 2 Yet, the system still fails to
provide fees that will adequately compensate diligent counsel and
has refused to recognize that "flat fee" provisions create difficult
ethical conflicts for lawyers.
Significantly, however, the
relationship between funding and effective assistance of counsel
has become part of the debate on criminal justice in Pennsylvania.
In a recent capital case, Justice Saylor set forth the disastrous
systemic results of a system in which appointed counsel is
unprepared, unqualified, and underpaid:
Having been charged by the trial judge to perform, effectively
on a shoestring, a task for which she was plainly unprepared
and unqualified, I have no doubt that this lawyer did what she
was able to do while also managing her regular practice....
Counsel failed entirely to conduct what any competent
attorney should recognize to be an indispensable centerpiece of
a capital defense case (particularly where, as here, there is
very strong evidence of guilt)-namely, a mitigation
investigation....
No presumption or platitude can sweep
aside this attorney's intolerably poor performance or the
damage it has caused. Of greatest concern, these sorts of
exceptionally costly failures, particularly as manifested across
the wider body of cases, diminish the State's credibility in
terms of its ability to administer capital punishment and
tarnish the justice system, which is an essential component of
such administration. 43
Justice Saylor has commented more broadly on the problems
of capital representation in Pennsylvania and has recognized that
the "atrocious representation" in the King case was not an
aberration."
Over the years, the state and federal courts (on
habeas petitions) have reversed the guilt or sentencing verdicts in
a large number of cases in Pennsylvania. As of 2011, over 125
capital murder convictions were vacated in whole or part based on
ineffectiveness of counsel (over seventy in Philadelphia County),
and in almost all of these cases new proceedings resulted in no
death penalty."' Whether this record will lead the courts (and
legislature) to upgrade the system remains to be seen, but the

142. See Compensation for Conflict Capital Case Representation, supra note 134.
143. Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 634-35 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, J.,
concurring).
144. Saylor, supra note 121, at 24-25.
145. Id. at 22-28.
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litigation strategy in Philadelphia can only be considered a partial
success.
B. State Court and ProsecutorialAttempts to Remove
FederalHabeas Defense Lawyers from State Court
Proceedings

Under current federal habeas corpus law, a federal
constitutional claim made by state prisoners can be adjudicated in
federal court only if the habeas petitioner has fully exhausted
state remedies and has not procedurally defaulted the claim by
failing to properly litigate and preserve claims in the state
courts.146 Further, under AEDPA,m17 the federal court must defer to
"reasonable" state court factual findings and legal rulings.'4 Thus,
the success of a state post-conviction or federal habeas petitioner
will often turn on the effectiveness of post-conviction counsel in
the state courts. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that in
general there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in state
or federal post-conviction proceedings and, therefore, even where
counsel is appointed or retained in the state proceedings, but fails
to present and preserve constitutional issues, there is no federal
remedy."' Congress has mandated representation in federal
habeas capital cases.o and federal defender offices have
established capital habeas units ("CHU") to provide this
representation. Over the past twenty years, the Philadelphia
CHU, which is a national model for effective and zealous postconviction representation, has obtained relief in over thirty capital
cases in Pennsylvania. 1 Part of the reason for the success of the
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012);
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
147. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
148. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1392 (2011).
149. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974). In Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1322, the Court permitted certain "defaulted"
claims to be presented in federal habeas proceedings where state post-conviction
counsel was ineffective.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2008).
151. Saylor, supra note 121, at 31-34. In Pennsylvania, there are close to two
hundred persons on death row, yet no one has been executed in the past forty-five
years (except for three persons who voluntarily gave up their appeals). See Peter

Hall, State Has Hundreds of Death Row Prisoners,But They're Seldom Executed,
THE MORNING CALL (May 22, 2011), http://articles.mcall.com/2011-05-22/news/
mc-pa-death-penalty-ballard-explainer20llO521_1death-penalty-death-row-firstdegree-murder ("Only three men, and no women, have been put to death since
capital punishment was restored in the mid-1970s after a brief nationwide
suspension, and each volunteered by abandoning his rights to appeal."); Persons

Sentenced

to

Execution

in

Pennsylvania,

PENN.

DEP'T

OF

CORR.,
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Philadelphia CHU has been its representation of death-sentenced
inmates in state post-conviction proceedings, either as a result of
an order of a federal court to provide such representation to
exhaust state remedies, on a pro bono basis with funding from
private sources, or as part of the preparation for the filing of a
federal habeas petition. 152
This successful enterprise has produced a host of critics.
Prosecutors in Pennsylvania have asserted that the CHU should
not provide counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, except in
cases where a federal court has specifically ordered such
representation for exhaustion purposes and has authorized federal
funding for the representation. 5 3 In 2011, the chief justice of the
state supreme court accused the Philadelphia CHU of improperly
using federal funds in state cases, over-zealous and unethical
lawyering, and improper briefing and advocacy efforts.'5" He
condemned the CHU for its supposedly extravagant expenditures
on behalf of death row inmates, to a degree, he lamented, that "is
beyond remarkable, something one would expect in major
litigation involving large law firms.""'
In a later capital appeal, the state supreme court ordered a
hearing on the issue of whether the CHU lawyers were improperly
using federal funds to represent the capital defendant in the state

http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/915857/executionlistl-pdf
(last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
152. The CHU's representation of capital defendants in Pennsylvania state postconviction proceedings has been necessitated by the lack of qualified and properly
compensated defense counsel in the state appointment system. Efforts by these
lawyers are severely compromised by funding limitations, and counsel who are
appointed for capital defendants at trial, appeal, and state post-conviction
proceedings are often without the resources necessary to provide effective
assistance. In many cases, court-appointed counsel have forfeited issues for federal
habeas by inexcusable defaults. See Saylor, supra note 121, at 32-22.
153. The debate about the CHU's representation of defendants in state postconviction proceedings revolves, in part, on the proper construction of the statute
establishing the right to counsel in federal capital habeas proceedings. See 18
U.S.C. § 3599 (2008).
154. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 330-31 (Pa. 2011) (Castille, J.,
concurring) ("But, the Defender has decided that federal tax dollars should be
deployed to conduct appellant's state collateral attacks; and, the federal authorities
who finance their state litigation strategy apparently approve the tactic. The
resources the Defender was able to bring to bear in litigating this state collateral
attack border on the perverse, and this fact, combined with the tactics employed,
and the obvious global efforts of the Defender to obstruct capital punishment in
Pennsylvania at all costs, strongly suggests that there is more at work here than
non-political, professionally responsible, 'zealous advocacy.'").
155. Id. at 332-33.
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post-conviction proceeding.'"'
In the wake of this order,
prosecutors across the state filed additional petitions to remove
the CHU lawyers in state post-conviction proceedings. 57 In
response, the CHU filed federal removal petitions on the counsel
issue."8
The prosecutors argue that the CHU lawyers employed by
the Federal Community Defender Organization ("FCDO"), a
federal grantee under the Criminal Justice Act, are not permitted
to use any federal funds in state post-conviction representation,
absent an order expressly permitting such representation by the
federal court, or where the state court activities are supported
The Commonwealth further
entirely with private resources."
argues that, regardless of the interpretation of the statute by the
Courts
States
United
the
of
Office
Administrative
("Administrative Office"), and even if the CHU's activities and
resource usage were found by the federal agency to be proper
under federal law, state courts may reach their own determination
about the meaning of federal law and federal grants, and
disqualify the CHU attorneys for unethical conduct."
The FCDO argues that its representation of capital
defendants in state post-conviction proceedings complies with
federal law and that whatever the constraints of federal law,
Congress has not authorized state courts or prosecutors to enforce
According to the Court, Congress entrusted the
§ 3599. 16
Administrative Office to administer funding under these statutes,
and that the Administrative Office has special competence to
determine whether a federal grantee's activities conform to its

156. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 617 CAP (Pa. 2013) (order remanding to the
post-conviction relief act court to determine whether appellant's current counsel
may continue representation).

157. See Saranac Hale Spencer, Battle over Federal Defenders Flares Again in
Pa.
Courts,
THE
LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER
(Sept.
10,
2013),
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202618664136?slreturn=
20140108163754.
158. See In re Pennsylvania, 13-CV-1871, 2013 WL 4193960, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
15, 2013).
159. Id. ("The essence of the Commonwealth's claim is that the FCDO should be
disqualified from representing Mitchell in his state post-conviction proceeding
because it is using federal monies in that representation, in violation of the
Criminal Justice Act and 18 U.S.C. § 3599.").
160. Id. at *1.
161. Id. at *3 ("[The Commonwealth] argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had jurisdiction to remove the FCDO as counsel by way of its power to
govern the practice of law as well as the general doctrine of concurrent
The FCDO submitted a brief opposing the Commonwealth's
jurisdiction ....
motion.").
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grant, to sanction any non-compliance, and to require whatever
adjustments may be needed for a grantee to maintain
compliance.1 62 As framed by the CHU, a central question is
whether the potential for conflicting applications of federal law
provides a basis for preemption."*
In Mitchell, the district court found the removal to be proper
under the federal officer removal statute.'" On the merits, the
court dismissed the Commonwealth's petition to disqualify the
CHU from state court proceedings.16 The court ruled that there
was not a private cause of action under the funding statute and,
therefore, the Commonwealth had no power to enforce that law.1 66
The court further rejected, as without precedent under the private
cause of action doctrine, the Commonwealth's argument that a
violation of funding regulations could be viewed as a violation of
the rules of professional conduct and the state rules simply
incorporated the federal funding regulations.167 Finally, the court

162. Id. at *5-7.
163. See Arizona v. United States, 182 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2012) (invalidating three
state provisions which interfered with federal immigration law enforcement laws).
The Court explained:
Arizona contends that § 3 can survive preemption because the provision
has the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive standards.
This argument not only ignores the basic premise of field preemptionthat States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government
has reserved for itself-but also is unpersuasive on its own terms.
Permitting the State to impose its own penalties for the federal offenses
here would conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted.
Id.
164. In re Pennsylvania, 13-CV-1871, 2013 WL 4193960, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2013) ("The Court denies the Commonwealth's motion to remand. The FCDO's
removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) and § 1446(g), in that the hearing
was directed to a person acting under a federal agency, pled a colorable defense
that the proceeding was related to an act taken under color of federal office, and
was timely removed."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1442(d)(1)
(Supp. 2013); In re Proceedings in Johnson, No. 13-2242, 2013 WL 4774499, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013) ("[T]he FDCO [sic] has met all requirements of the federal
officer removal statute and thus jurisdiction in this Court is proper."); In re
Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint New Counsel v. Harris, No. 13-62, 2013 WL
4501056, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2013) ("To the extent the general state interest in
regulating the practice of law may be implicated, it is insufficient to override the
policy underlying federal officer removal statute which supports removal in this
matter"). At the time of this Article going to press, these cases are all under
consideration by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on cross appeal. Another court
has remanded cases to the state courts, finding that the FCDO is not "acting under"
In re Commonwealth v.
a federal officer in its state court representation.
Sepulveda, Civ. A. No. 3:13-CV-511, 2013 WL 4459005, at *8-10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16,
2013).
165. In re Pennsylvania, 2013 WL 4193960, at *1.
166. Id. at *12.
167. Id. at *16.
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determined that even if incorporation of the federal laws and
regulations could be the basis of state attorney disqualification,
the preemption doctrine would bar such a proceeding as an
attempt to "'police' alleged misrepresentations and violations in an
area that is within the purview of a federal agency."168
Something more fundamental is at stake in this litigation
than the legal issues regarding removal of these cases from state
to federal court, private rights of action, and preemption. The
concerted attempt by Pennsylvania courts and prosecutors to
disqualify the most experienced and effective counsel for capital
defendants in Pennsylvania presents a disturbing effort to tilt the
Disqualification of counsel of choice is
scales of justice.
controversial in any event, 6 9 but where there is no asserted
conflict of interest, lack of experience, or other ground that
supports the state's interest in a fair adjudication of the case,
wholesale removal of defense counsel threatens the integrity of
these proceedings. While the state has an interest in enforcing
ethical obligations and professional responsibility, the supposed
violations of funding rules administered by the Administrative
Office seem very far afield from these core interests.
Fifty years ago, civil rights activists and protesters in states
throughout the South invoked a different removal statute as a
means of defending against racially biased state court
prosecutions.'
Ultimately, the Supreme Court narrowed the
scope of this statute and made it almost impossible to remove the
state prosecution."' Today, in a period marked by sharp debate on
the functioning of the criminal justice system, it is noteworthy
that the strategy of removal of cases to federal court that involve
the fundamental right to counsel is again being used to protect
against hostile state systems.

168. Id. at *17-18 ("Even if the Court were to apply a presumption against
preemption, it would still find that the Commonwealth's application of state law is
preempted.").
169. See David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1965 (1988).

170. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally
Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to
Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 803 (1965).
171. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780, 805-06 (1966).
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Flora v. Luzerne County: A Compromised Defender
Office and a Tale of PoliticalInterference and Grossly
Inadequate Funding

The judicial system of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania
achieved much notoriety recently as a result of a scandal known as
"kids for cash." 7 Two state court judges who handled juvenile
criminal cases denied thousands of defendants their right to
counsel and to a fair hearing in juvenile proceedings and
invariably imposed custodial sentences for even the most minor
infractions."'
These judges were primarily motivated in this
enterprise by financial considerations; they had significant
investments in juvenile centers where the defendants were
incarcerated, and were otherwise financially rewarded for
sentencing the defendants to these institutions. 174
Others in the criminal justice system were complicit in these
criminal acts."'7 Prosecutors and defenders failed to object to the
railroading that occurred in thousands of cases over a several year
period, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored legal
petitions seeking judicial intervention in what became one of the
largest judicial scandals in the state's history. Only when federal
authorities indicted the judges did the state supreme court order
the expungement of thousands of convictions.'7 6
It also became clear that the systemic flaws in the county's
criminal justice system were not limited to juvenile court. The
County Public Defender reported a severe lack of resources for
representation of its adult cases, with caseloads far in excess of
professional standards.'7 7 For years, the chief defender had sought
budget increases, and for years these requests were denied."'
Ultimately, the chief defender became the lead plaintiff in
litigation seeking additional resources.' 7 9
In this class action, the following evidence regarding
representation by the public defender office was developed:
2

172. United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 713 (3d Cir. 2013).
173. See id. at 713-14 (upholding RICO convictions by the state court judges).
174. Id. at 715.
175. Id. at 714-15.
176. In re Expungement of Juvenile Records & Vacatur of Luzerne Cnty.
Juvenile Court Consent Degrees or Adjudications from 2003-2008, No. 81 MM
2008 (Pa. 2008).
177. Complaint and Notice of Removal at 8, Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., Civ. Act. No.
3:13-1478, 2013 WL 4520854, (M.D. Pa. 2013) [hereinafter Complaint and Notice of
Removal].
178. Id. at 8-12.
179. Id. at 4.
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1. A staff with the equivalent of 13.5 full-time attorneys was
handling an average of approximately 450 cases each and
appearing at 10,000 hearings annually;
2. There were no trained or specifically assigned appellate
attorneys;
3. There was insufficient investigative and clerical staff to
handle basic case investigation and case management;
4. The physical facilities at the defender office did not provide
space for confidential interviews or communications with clients or
for storage of case files;
5. There was inadequate information technology including a
lack of computers and case management and scheduling software;
and
6. Personnel and other resources were far less than those
provided to the Luzerne County District Attorney.'8

As in other jurisdictions where severe underfunding and high
caseloads unfairly compromised the right to counsel, the key
litigation questions focused on the standards for assessing
effectiveness of counsel faced with very high caseloads and
whether a judicial remedy was available at the pre-trial stage of
the proceedings. Plaintiffs claimed that defender clients were
being denied assistance of counsel at critical stages of the
proceedings, that whatever assistance was eventually provided
was highly likely to be ineffective due to high caseloads and lack of
defense resources-including investigators, experts and social
workers-and that the deficiencies in the system were so
pervasive as to permit a court to assess the "ineffectiveness" issue
pre-trial, in the context of a civil rights lawsuit.'"
Plaintiffs alleged that the County's practices violated
criminal defendants' rights under the Sixth Amendment, the
Pennsylvania State Constitution, the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional

Conduct, and ABA

standards.'82

In particular,

plaintiffs relied upon Rule 1.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Professional Conduct, requiring that a "lawyer shall provide
competent representation. . . [with] the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation"'" and an ABA Ethics Opinion that provides that

180. See Report of Expert for Plaintiff, Professor Norman Lefstein at 11, Flora v.
Luzerne Cnty., Civ. Act. No. 3:13-1478 (2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Lefstein Report]; Complaint and Notice of Removal, supra note 177.
181. Complaint and Notice of Removal, supra note 177, at 12.
182. Id. at 2-14.
183. Id. at 14.
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"[a] lawyer's primary ethical duty is owed to existing clients."'"
Under these rules, "a lawyer must decline to accept new cases,
rather than withdraw from existing cases, if the acceptance of a
new case will result in her workload becoming excessive." "
Plaintiffs secured preliminary relief based on evidence
establishing the inability of defenders to provide effective
assistance given the serious structural deficiencies in the
system.8 6 The court ordered the County to take certain steps on
an interim basis, including filling vacant attorney positions,
developing a plan to meet the constitutional obligations for
indigent representation, and providing adequate office space to
ensure confidentiality in attorney-client communications.' 87
Following discovery on the caseload issues, plaintiffs' expert
Professor Norman Lefstein concluded that the combination of very
high caseloads, lack of investigative and support services, use of
"part-time" defenders, and lack of satisfactory office space
prevented the Defender from providing proper representation."
He stated that "the Public Defender and its lawyers are not in
compliance with Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct in
providing representation in adult criminal cases," and further that
"an unknown number of the agency's clients are not receiving
reasonably competent counsel as required by the Sixth
Amendment.""
The political side of this litigation became evident as the case
was nearing trial in 2013. The County insisted that there was
insufficient proof that caseloads were too high and that with more
efficient allocation of resources, effective counsel could be provided
to Defender clients."c' The chief defender continued to press
county officials for additional funding and became critical of a
number of failures on the part of the County to deal with its
obligations to expunge juvenile records in the wake of the "kids for
cash" scandal. 9' In early 2013, the County dismissed the chief

184. ABA Formal Opinion 06-441, supra note 97, at 4.
185. Id. at 5.
186. Order of June 15, Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., Civ. Act. No. 2012-04517 (Ct. of
Common Pleas of Luzerne Cnty. 2012).
187. Id.
188. Lefstein Report, supra note 180, at 16.
189. Id. at 16-17.
190. Order of October 22, Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., Civ. Act. No. 2012-04517 (Ct.
of Common Pleas of Luzerne Cnty. 2013) [hereinafter Order of October 22].
191. Complaint and Notice of Removal, supra note 177, at 9-11.
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defender" and was then successful in dismissing the case on lack
The case is currently on appeal to the
of standing.193
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania."
Litigation strategies and political disputes aside, the funding,
resource and ethical issues in this case are well defined and
present the court with a full record on which to make the
constitutional determinations. To be sure, county-by-county, or
even state-by-state litigation is a difficult and inefficient means of
implementing constitutional standards on a national basis for the
operation of Defender offices. However, with a number of state
supreme courts permitting pre-trial challenges seeking adequate
funding, a litigation model for similar challenges is being
developed.
Conclusion
The failure of the Gideon promise and the crisis in indigent
criminal defense is the direct result of a lack of political and
judicial responsibility. There are a number of complementary
political measures, legislative reforms, and judicial interventions
that could begin to remedy the structural causes of ineffective
counsel, but it is highly unlikely that the necessary changes will
be effectuated without judicial mandates for adequate funding and
resources. The problem is not one of legal doctrine or lack of
factual proof; rather, it is one of judicial "will," and whether the
status quo will be altered depends in large part on the how the
courts view their role in enforcing Sixth Amendment protections
for the criminally accused.

192. Jennifer Learn-Andes, County Public Defender Fired, TIMESLEADER.COM
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.timesleader.com/news/local-news/442381/Countypublic-defender-fired.
193. Order of October 22, supra note 190.
194. Notice of Appeal, Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., Civ. Act. No. 2012-04517 (Ct. of
2013), available at
Cnty. Nov. 20,
of Luzerne
Common Pleas
http://www.aclupa.org/downloadfile/view-inline/1459/695/.

